ACFA: Secure Runtime Auditing Guaranteed Device Healing via Active Control Flow Attestation
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Low-end embedded devices are increasingly used in various smart applications and spaces. They are implemented under strict cost and energy budgets, using microcontroller units (MCUs) that lack security features available in general-purpose processors. In this context, Remote Attestation (RA) was proposed as an inexpensive security service to enable a verifier (Vrf) to remotely detect illegal modifications to a software binary installed on a low-end prover MCU (Prv). Since attacks that hijack the software's control flow can evade RA, Control Flow Attestation (CFA) augments RA with information about the exact order in which instructions in the binary are executed, enabling detection of control flow attacks. We observe that current CFA architectures can not guarantee that Vrf ever receives control flow reports in case of attacks. In turn, while they support exploit detection, they provide no means to pinpoint the exploit origin. Furthermore, existing CFA requires either binary instrumentation, incurring significant runtime overhead and code size increase, or relatively expensive hardware support, such as hash engines. In addition, current techniques are neither continuous (only meant to attest self-contained operations) nor active (offer no secure means to remotely remediate detected compromises). To jointly address these challenges, we propose ACFA: a hybrid (hardware/software) architecture for Active CFA. ACFA enables continuous monitoring of all control flow transfers in the MCU and does not require binary instrumentation. It also leverages the recently proposed concept of Active Roots-of-Trust to enable secure auditing of vulnerability sources and guaranteed remediation when a compromise is detected. We provide an open-source reference implementation of ACFA on top of a commodity low-end MCU (TI MSP430) and evaluate it to demonstrate its security and cost-effectiveness.
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