Efficient Carpooling and Toll Pricing for Autonomous Transportation

02/18/2021
by   Saurabh Amin, et al.
0

In this paper, we address the existence and computation of competitive equilibrium in the transportation market for autonomous carpooling first proposed by [Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2019]. At equilibrium, the market organizes carpooled trips over a transportation network in a socially optimal manner and sets the corresponding payments for individual riders and toll prices on edges. The market outcome ensures individual rationality, stability of carpooled trips, budget balance, and market clearing properties under heterogeneous rider preferences. We show that the question of market's existence can be resolved by proving the existence of an integer optimal solution of a linear programming problem. We characterize conditions on the network topology and riders' disutility for carpooling under which a market equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. This characterization relies on ideas from the theory of combinatorial auctions and minimum cost network flow problem. Finally, we characterize a market equilibrium that achieves strategyproofness and maximizes welfare of individual riders.

READ FULL TEXT

Please sign up or login with your details

Forgot password? Click here to reset