Route-cost-assignment with joint user and operator behavior as a many-to-one stable matching assignment game
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We propose a generalized market equilibrium model using assignment game criteria for evaluating transportation systems that consist of both operators and users: fixed route transit, multimodal systems, and Mobility-as-a-Service in general. The model finds stable pricing and matches between users in a network with a set of routes with line capacities. The proposed model gives a set of stable outcomes instead of single point pricing that allows operators to design their ticket pricing based on a desired mechanism or policy (as opposed to other matching studies that focus on operating a specific mechanism design). We look at three different examples to test our model. As a case study we evaluate taxi ridesharing in NYC. Based on the taxi data and study area in Lower Manhattan, the model justifies a market share of 71.8 would take shared rides. Sharing taxi results in a 31.4 mileage. The model suggests that adopting a policy that can require passengers to walk up to 1 block away to meet with a shared taxi would require the operating cost savings to exceed the 0.44/traveler by another 0.13 if they do not wish to turn away any of these passengers.
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