The Devil is in the GAN: Defending Deep Generative Models Against Backdoor Attacks
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Deep Generative Models (DGMs) allow users to synthesize data from complex, high-dimensional manifolds. Industry applications of DGMs include data augmentation to boost performance of (semi-)supervised machine learning, or to mitigate fairness or privacy concerns. Large-scale DGMs are notoriously hard to train, requiring expert skills, large amounts of data and extensive computational resources. Thus, it can be expected that many enterprises will resort to sourcing pre-trained DGMs from potentially unverified third parties, e.g. open source model repositories. As we show in this paper, such a deployment scenario poses a new attack surface, which allows adversaries to potentially undermine the integrity of entire machine learning development pipelines in a victim organization. Specifically, we describe novel training-time attacks resulting in corrupted DGMs that synthesize regular data under normal operations and designated target outputs for inputs sampled from a trigger distribution. Depending on the control that the adversary has over the random number generation, this imposes various degrees of risk that harmful data may enter the machine learning development pipelines, potentially causing material or reputational damage to the victim organization. Our attacks are based on adversarial loss functions that combine the dual objectives of attack stealth and fidelity. We show its effectiveness for a variety of DGM architectures (Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), Variational Autoencoders (VAEs)) and data domains (images, audio). Our experiments show that - even for large-scale industry-grade DGMs - our attack can be mounted with only modest computational efforts. We also investigate the effectiveness of different defensive approaches (based on static/dynamic model and output inspections) and prescribe a practical defense strategy that paves the way for safe usage of DGMs.
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