We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion with one informed sender and
...
We study an information aggregation setting in which a decision maker ma...
In a misspecified social learning setting, agents are condescending if t...
We study a variant of the principal-agent problem in which the principal...
A sender communicates with a receiver through a sequence of mediators. T...
We consider a population of Bayesian agents who share a common prior ove...
The celebrated Bayesian persuasion model considers strategic communicati...
We study a Bayesian persuasion setting with binary actions (adopt and re...
We analyze boundedly rational updating from aggregate statistics in a mo...
We consider (i) the problem of finding a (possibly mixed) Nash equilibri...
Bayesian persuasion, as introduced by Kamenica and Gentzkow in 2011, is ...
We prove communication complexity lower bounds for (possibly mixed) Nash...
Given a directed forest-graph, a probabilistic selection mechanism is
a ...
We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a g...
We investigate the possibility of an incentive-compatible (IC, a.k.a.
st...
We consider extensive form win-lose games over a complete binary-tree of...
We analyse strategic, complete information, sequential voting with ordin...
We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the ...
Our work bridges the literature on incentive-compatible mechanism design...
We study the following communication variant of local search. There is s...
We consider the forecast aggregation problem in repeated settings, where...