Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) can use information about which ballot cards...
An election audit is risk-limiting if the audit limits (to a pre-specifi...
Card-level comparison risk-limiting audits (CLCAs) heretofore required a...
Instant-runoff voting (IRV) is used in several countries around the worl...
Many widely used models amount to an elaborate means of making up
number...
Stratified sampling can be useful in risk-limiting audits (RLAs), for
in...
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) guarantee a high probability of correcting
i...
Ranked voting systems, such as instant-runoff voting (IRV) and single
tr...
This paper explains the main principles and some of the technical detail...
BRAVO, the most widely tried method for risk-limiting election audits, c...
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs), an ingredient in evidence-based elections, ...
Accurately determining the outcome of an election is a complex task with...
Presidential primaries are a critical part of the United States Presiden...
U.S. elections rely heavily on computers such as voter registration
data...
Counting votes is complex and error-prone. Several statistical methods h...
The City and County of San Francisco, CA, has used Instant Runoff Voting...
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) for many social choice functions can be redu...
Election system vendors are marketing ballot-marking devices (BMDs) as a...
Many voter-verifiable, coercion-resistant schemes have been proposed, bu...
Practical or scientific considerations often lead to selecting a subset ...
Indian Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) will be fitted with printers th...
We present a method and software for ballot-polling risk-limiting audits...
The pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs), sampling algorithms, and
al...
R (Version 3.5.1 patched) has an issue with its random sampling
function...
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) offer a statistical guarantee: if a full man...
Colorado conducted risk-limiting tabulation audits (RLAs) across the sta...